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In the past two decades privatisation and liberalisation of network industries providing 
services of general economic interest (SGEI), have been particularly significant in the 
European Union. Wide variations around a common policy trend can, however, be observed 
across countries and sectors. We focus on electricity and gas sectors because energy sectors 
have usually been profit makers, not affected by direct government transfers, in contrast to 
other SGEI. We study the effects of privatisation and other reforms on consumer prices using 
both subjective data on consumers’ perception of utility prices and data on average prices 
paid. 
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In the past two decades privatisation and liberalisation of network industries 
providing services of general economic interest, such as electricity, gas, fixed and 
mobile telephony, water, and railways, have been particularly significant in the 
European Union. The key feature of these industries is that they include both a major 
fixed-cost component, the network, under increasing returns to scale, and several 
potentially competitive upstream or downstream operations. This feature leads often 
to natural monopoly for the network services, and potential market dominance of the 
vertically integrated network owner. Before the 1970s wide disappointment with 
earlier private monopolies or oligopolies, sheltered by various forms of long-term 
concessions, led most European governments to take control of industries often 
plagued by collusion, underinvestment and price discrimination. Millward (2005) 
offers a masterly account of the often more pragmatic than political reasons behind 
nationalisation and consolidation of energy industries in Europe in the last century. 
In the 1970s, however, there was a dramatic policy reversal. In the mid-1980s the 
United Kingdom was the front-runner of reform, while, among the EU Member 
States, France has often been regarded as a country averse to moving away from 
public monopoly. In fact, in the last 15-20 years virtually all European countries have 
undertaken dramatic regulatory reforms in the network industries. Wide variations 
around a common policy trend can, however, be observed across countries and 
sectors, allowing us to assess the effects of the policy reform, and to study its effects 
on users.  
A typical ‘European-style’ reform package has four main dimensions: divestiture of 
public ownership; unbundling of the network from service operations; price 
regulation by an independent office (usually in the form of price capping); lifting of 
restrictions to market entry and finally full liberalisation. According to some early 
views, price controls had to be considered as a transitory mechanism to protect the 
consumer before full liberalisation, so that only generic anti-trust vigilance was 
needed at the end of the process (see e.g. Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; Newbery, 2000; 
Pollitt, 2007). 1 
 
In general, the EU institutions have been strongly supportive of the reforms, which 
are more advanced than in other regions. While neutral on public ownership 
divestiture, over the years the European Commission has proposed a number of 
important directives on energy sectors that push the Member States towards a 
homogenous pattern of regulatory legislation (see e.g. CEC, 2007). A new paradigm 
has emerged, and legislation is shaped by it across Europe. We want to test the 
paradigm on empirical grounds, disentangling the effect of privatisation from that of 
other reforms. 
In this paper, we consider EU15 only, because data for the New Member States are 
less reliable, the time series are shorter, and privatisation and regulatory change from 
former planned economies is less comparable with change in industrial organisation 
elsewhere. We also limit our analysis to two energy industries (electricity, gas), each 
representing different stages and features of the reform story. This is a subset of all 
the network industries, but the core ones for most consumers.  Moreover, 
government-owned providers in energy were not loss makers, their prices covered 
costs, and comparison with pricing of private firms is more meaningful than in other 
sectors. 
As a first preliminary empirical exercise we analyse subjective data on perceived 
fairness of energy prices, using data from four Eurobarometer surveys collected 
between 2000 and 2006 and contrast them with trends of reforms as measured in a 
separate data set, the Indicators of Regulation in Energy, Transport and 
Communications (ETCR, and formerly known as REGREF), recently released by the 
OECD. Previous empirical research shows that it is unlikely that there is a positive 
net benefit of a policy reform if consumers do not get a fair dividend from it, see e.g. 
Ugaz and Waddams Price (2003). Moreover, if consumers do not perceive any net 
benefit, at a certain stage they can shift from indifference to opposition, as happened 
with similar reforms in Latin America, see e.g. Checchi et al. (2009). A simple 
inspection of the Eurobarometer surveys suggests that decreasing consumers’ 
dissatisfaction might be correlated with more reforms. However, once we control for 
individual and for country-level characteristics, the latter including indicators of the 
reform, we find some interesting results, namely that the likelihood of consumers’ 2 
 
dissatisfaction with the price they pay is consistently lower in countries where the 
ownership of the energy industries is public.  
Although informative and relevant from a political economy point of view, 
correlations between consumers’ preferences and reforms might be flawed by 
measurement errors or subject to various individual biases. We only take them as 
motivating evidence for analysing the issue further. As there is no comparable 
information on the prices paid by individual households in Europe, in this paper we 
focus on a long panel of actual average prices paid in the EU15. 
A similar approach was followed for testing the impact of reforms by other authors, 
focussing however on variables other than prices. For example, Azmat et al. (2007) 
use REGREF variables to test the impact of privatisation and market liberalisation on 
employment and wages in several network industries in the OECD. Alesina et al. 
(2005) also use REGREF data for OECD countries to study product market 
regulation and investment. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) use REGREF to study 
privatisation, liberalisation and productivity growth patterns across countries, 
particularly between continental Europe, the US and the UK.  
Our main research question is: Are consumer prices of electricity and gas lower 
(after controlling for country and industry specific factors) in countries that 
implemented privatisation and liberalisation reforms? We are also interested to see 
whether consumers’ perceptions of price fairness are correlated to actual prices. 
The structure of the paper is the following: first, we briefly review some key facts 
about the reform and price trends in the European industries under consideration 
(Section 2). Then we look at the correlations between individual dissatisfaction of 
consumers with the price they pay for energy services and reform variables (Section 
3). Earlier literature is briefly discussed in Section 4. Then we present our empirical 
modelling strategy (Section 5), the data we use (Section 6), and our results (Section 
7). In Section 8, we discuss our findings and conclude offering some policy 
implications.  
2. 1B1BREFORM AND  ENERGY PRICE TRENDS 
The typical network industries reform package is characterised by privatisation, 
unbundling, and market opening. In the last two decades the EU has witnessed a 3 
 
considerable variability of policy combinations thereof. Thus we want to test 
separately the effects of privatisation and of the other two reforms.  
Our research strategy is to focus on the energy industries because they cover 
different technological and institutional features. Electricity is a sector where the 
reforms started in the 1990s, with persistent differences in technologies and in the 
endowment of fuel resources across countries, while gas is a late-comer in the 
reform. The technology is similar across countries, but there are variations in 
dependency on a homogenous natural resource.  
Public enterprises in these two sectors were (or are) profit-makers in Western 
Europe, and usually had no difficulty in financing their investments, hence their 
pricing is usually not affected by government transfers, as in other network industries 
(e.g. railways).  
For each of these sectors the regulatory history has been summarised in the 
Indicators of Regulation in Energy, Transport and Communications (ETCR), recently 
(April 2009) released by the OECD and covering years 1975-2007 (Conway and 
Nicoletti, 2006). ETCR database provides an industry measure that comes from the 
aggregation of different dimensions of the reforms, such as public ownership, 
vertical integration, market entry, which themselves come as an aggregation of 
further decomposition of each regulatory dimension. All these indices score from 0 
to 6, under different headings and sub-headings. An industry characterised by full 
public ownership, vertical integration, no access to the industry except for the public 
operator scores 6 in the aggregated indicator, which comes as the average of the 
maximum score reached in all subindicators. At the other extreme, an industry that is 
operated by private operators only, with total unbundling of its production process 
and full market opening will score 0, the minimum.  
Figure 1 presents the history of regulatory reform in a concise way, where trends 
are reported for the average of the overall and public ownership ETCR indicator, for 
each energy industry. The downward trend of the public ownership and overall 
ETCR index emerges, with the latter being more pronounced than the former, 
meaning that other dimensions of the reform (namely, entry liberalisation and 
unbundling) had an even more pronounced decreasing dynamics. The electricity 
industry reform starting date was around late 1980s: while unbundling and entry 4 
 
regulation were forced by EU legislation, it is interesting to notice that public 
ownership decreasing trend was particularly relevant since the end of the 1990s. 
Market structure in electricity is not reported in ETCR, but there is evidence 
elsewhere (CEC 2007) of a tendency towards oligopoly with a competitive fringe 
(Helm, 2003). In the gas sector the overall process of liberalisation and divestiture of 
public ownership is less pronounced, although the average indicator of public 
ownership decreased one point from an initial average of five. In fact, after a start-up 
in the mid-1980s, privatisation proceeded very slowly and has stopped in several 
countries in recent years. 
How did consumer prices evolve since the end of 1970s? Figure 1 also depicts the 
median price of each SGEI across the EU15, using the longest times series available 
of average national prices, deflated using the yearly national consumer price index 
and setting at 100 the median price in 1978 (more details on the price data used will 
be provided in Section 6). The first panel shows the clear downward trend of 
electricity prices during the 1980s and the 1990s although the trend was partly the 
opposite before and after this period. It is however worth noting that the downward 
price trend started well before the reform wave showed its first signs: about half the 
average price reduction happened before 1990, when the reforms started in the UK 
(the front runner of reforms in the EU15). Another third happened before 1996, when 
the first EU Directive was approved. After 2003, when the second EU directive was 
approved, the price started increasing, most likely due to the increasing cost of oil, a 
relevant input in energy production. The correlation between prices and reforms is 
even less clear in the gas industry (second panel): prices increased up to early 1980s, 
while no reform had started. Major price reductions took place between 1985 and 
2000, while the ETCR index had barely reduced and in the following years the two 
series present a negative correlation. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
It is also informative to look at price figures deflated using the consumer price 
index for some relevant years in two key countries, the UK and France often 
regarded as at the two extremes of reform policy implementation (Table 1). In 1978 
the standard deviation of electricity prices in the EU was wide, about as large as its 
average and prices paid in France and in the UK are equal and well below the EU15 5 
 
mean. Since 1990 up until the end of the period considered, French prices tend to be 
lower and UK ones higher than the average, besides the convergence of prices across 
the EU15 as showed by the decreasing standard deviation. In 1978 French gas prices 
where about 50% higher than the UK prices, which were close to the EU average 
level. After thirty years gas prices for these two countries converged close to the 
average. 
The message from this example is twofold: first, relative prices show strong and 
different dynamics across countries; second, to study the impact of privatisation and 
liberalisation we need to control for possible cost and demand shifters across sectors, 
as the simple correlation between prices and reform trends is weak. 
[Table 1 about here] 
3. 3B3BEVIDENCE ON SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF PRICE FAIRNESS 
In this section  we briefly present the data used for the analysis of consumers’ 
perceptions and main results. The objective of this preliminary analysis is to show 
that there may be some dissatisfaction in Europe with the outcome of energy 
reforms.
1 
3.1. The data used for the analysis of consumers’ perceptions 
For analysing consumer perceptions on prices, we used self-rated dissatisfaction 
with the prices paid for each service considered (electricity and gas) by a 
representative sample of EU15 citizens, as measured in the Eurobarometer (2002, 
2004, 2006, 2008) surveys (henceforth EB), which were run biannually between 
2000 and 2008. Although formulated in a very generic way,FF
2
FF the question of price 
satisfaction was checked for consistency with the prices paid by an average 
consumer. The EB data also include a large list of individual characteristics, allowing 
us to control for some individual heterogeneity. Using the EB data we had four 
                                                 
1 A more detailed analysis on consumers’ price dissatisfaction in the electricity market can be found 
in Fiorio and Florio (2010). 
2 The question for the electricity service is “In general, would you say that the price you pay for the 
electricity supply service is fair or unfair?”, and similarly for gas and fixed telecom services. 6 
 
separate cross-sections comprising over 50,000 individual opinions about electricity 
and telecommunication prices and around 30,000 about natural gas prices.FF
3 
As for the regulatory reform variables, including measures of entry regulation, 
public ownership, market structure, vertical integration, in varying levels of detail, 
we used data provided by the ECTR data set. These data have a yearly frequency, are 
available since 1975 and up to 2007 and present detailed information allowing one to 
capture the industry-specific trends of reforms in both sectors considered here. As 
mentioned in Section 2, each ETCR score, going from 0 to 6, is computed as a 
weighted average of public ownership, vertical integration, market structure and 
entry regulation scores, by assigning a cardinal measure to variables that are only 
ordinal.  
We use the overall ETCR score as an indicator of the overall reform but then we 
introduced our own coding of subindicators. In particular, we defined dummy 
variables where only ordinal variables are available in the first place. For instance, 
for each industry, we defined a dummy variable for public ownership equal to 1 if 
the industry is “public” and zero otherwise. A dummy variable for entry regulation 
equal to 1 if there is “no third party access, full entry regulation” and zero otherwise. 
A dummy variable for vertical integration equal to 1 if the industry is “vertically 
integrated” and zero otherwise. This approach avoids any possible measurement bias 
with cardinalisation as in the original ETCR scores. No market structure measure is 
available for electricity, while the market structure dummy for the gas industry is 
equal to 1 if the market share in all segments of the industry is larger than 90% (for 
more details on the question addressed in the ECTR database, the original and our 
coding, refer to Table 2 and Table 3). 
[Table 2 and Table 3 about here] 
Price perceptions by consumers may capture individual information misrepresented 
by average statistical data on prices, but subjective bias and information noise in 
perceptions can arise. Moreover, policy adoption or reversal can be influenced by 
perceptions. These data can also be criticised on several grounds as subjective 
evidence is notoriously fickle. For instance, there might be a “hedonic treadmill” 
                                                 
3 Respondents about gas prices were fewer as in some countries (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Sweden) 
there is often very limited natural gas service provision. 7 
 
effect whereby satisfaction changes with outcomes so that, for example, if a country 
has enjoyed a big price cut in one period, consumers expect this again and are 
dissatisfied if this does not happen again in the next period.FF
4
F 
We use subjective dissatisfaction data to be analysed with dichotomous dependent 
variable models. The model for consumer price dissatisfaction rests on the definition 
of a variable disentangling satisfied from relatively dissatisfied consumers regarding 
the price paid for a particular network service. This variable is recorder equal to 0 if 
individual j in country i at time t states that the price he pays for fixed telephone 
services is fair, and is recorded equal to 1 otherwise. We then estimate a standard 
probit model for individual dissatisfaction, where we control for year and country 
fixed effects, a vector of individual characteristics (i.e. sex, occupation, etc.) 
accounting for individual observed heterogeneity, a vector of macroeconomic control 
variables including population density, GDP levels, consumer price index and the 
total price (including all taxes) of a unit of each industry’s provided service. Finally, 
we control for a set of regulatory variables. 
We estimate this probit models with maximum likelihood for each industry and 
interpret any significant coefficient in the vector of regulatory variables as a sign of 
the fact that regulatory reforms have some effect on consumer satisfaction regarding 
prices. A priori, we have no expectation as for the statistical significance nor for the 
sign of the coefficients of the regulatory variables.
5 
Table 4 shows results for dissatisfaction with electricity prices, focussing on 
regulatory variables only.
6 The first column shows no significant correlation with the 
overall reform indicator and dissatisfaction with electricity prices paid by the 
European consumer. As the ECTR score might hide important information, we 
estimated the probit model replacing the ECTR score with regulatory dummies and 
found that the likelihood of dissatisfaction is roughly 10% lower in countries where 
there is public ownership of the electricity industry, even after controlling for country 
fixed effects. The other regulatory variables considered show that less liberalisation, 
as measured by less vertical integration and less constraints to enter the market, 
increase dissatisfaction among consumers, although entry regulation dummies are 
                                                 
4 For a seminar paper on this issue, see Kahneman et al. (1986). 
5 See our discussion below about possible directions of price changes following reforms. 8 
 
statistically significant only when vertical integration variables are omitted, due to 
multicollinearity. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As for the analysis of gas supply dissatisfaction, Table 5 shows similar results as 
for public ownership. While the other liberalisation variables are not statistically 
significant, the overall reform indicator is estimated to have a significant and 
negative sign, meaning that the more advance the reform process is (i.e. the lower the 
GR index) the higher is dissatisfaction. 
[Table 5 about here] 
With all the caution one might reasonably have about using self-assessed 
satisfaction with prices paid by consumers, these results suggest that there is a 
consistent difference in dissatisfaction among EU citizens depending on how far their 
country is gone in privatisation and other reforms. This motivates the rest of the 
paper. Are these perceptions justified by actual price changes? 
4. EARLIER LITERATURE 
Consumers’ dissatisfaction about the prices paid for energy after privatisation can 
be biased and we need to turn to a more traditional question. Can we predict how 
prices may respond to privatisation and regulatory reforms of utilities? The case for 
privatisation is reviewed, inter alia, by Bös (1991),Vickers and Yarrow (1993), 
Parker (1998), Newbery (2000),  Florio (2004), Megginson (2005), Roland (2008). 
On the issue of the welfare impact of privatisation a seminal paper by Sappington 
and Stiglitz (1987) established the conditions for indifference between public and 
private ownership. They show that under different information structures a 
benevolent policy-maker who can write complete contracts achieves the same 
welfare outcomes of private owners. This result prompted two research lines: 
privatisation under incomplete contracts, see Schmidt (1996), where the government 
is unable to get all the information needed to achieve the Sappington-Stiglitz result; 
or privatisation where the policy makers have a private agenda, see Shapiro and 
Willig (1990). On the incomplete contract side the divestiture of public ownership is 
seen as a mechanism that prevents governments to achieve full information and to 
                                                                                                                                          
6 For the results showing macroeconomic and individual controls, see the Appendix. 9 
 
wipe away agent’s rents. The regulator gives information rents to private agents in 
exchange of efficiency-enhancing investment. Hence social welfare increases. The 
model rests, inter alia, on the assumption that the private agent only has the capital, 
or knowledge, or the incentives to sink new investment. On a different vein Laffont 
and Tirole (1993) stress the trade off that the managers face when they need to 
respond to private owners and to regulators. This is a multi-principal context in 
which privatisation can be socially beneficial if the objectives of managers and of 
shareholders are more aligned than the objectives of the manager and the regulator. 
In this context, similar outcomes can be obtained by different layers of government 
or different offices in charge of ownership, management and regulation of the utility. 
Thus, the hypothesis that privatisation is rooted in the limited commitment credibility 
of government does not provide a clear-cut answer to our question. If privatisation 
enhances efficiency through information rents given to the agent, unit cost may 
decrease more than the mark-up on costs, but the same result may be achieved by a 
combination of public ownership, managerial discretion, and independent regulation. 
When quality is also considered, as by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), several 
outcomes are possible, and in general  privatisation is less desirable where 
competition is limited. The distinction between privatisation and liberalisation is a 
core one. In Vickers and Yarrow (1993, p. 44) words: “ Where product markets are 
competitive, it is more likely that the benefits of private monitoring (e.g. improved 
internal efficiency) will exceed any accompanying detriments (e.g. worsened 
allocative efficiency)[…]. In the absence of vigorous product market competition, 
however,  the balance of advantage is less clear cut, and much will depend upon the 
effectiveness of regulatory policy”.  
Turning to the public choice strand of privatisation theory, it rests on the realistic 
hypothesis that policy makers have private agenda and they  distort the management 
of utilities to favour rent extraction. Earlier models, such as Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1996) tend to say that the divestiture of public ownership is welfare 
enhancing because transfers between the Treasury and the utility are more 
transparent, and this limits rent extractions by politicians. It is, however unclear, in 
this context, why politicians would sell public enterprises, as they did on a huge scale 
in the last twenty years. Florio (2004) observes the inconsistency of assuming 10 
 
benevolent policy makers under privatisation and non-benevolent ones under 
nationalisation. Laffont (2005) presents a model where privatisation occurs with a 
corrupted government, and shows under some assumptions that the welfare outcome 
is non linear in corruption, and that in some case privatisation occurs for the “wrong” 
reasons, i.e. as an alternative way to extract rents by the politician. Thus, also the 
second strand of privatisation theory, while in general more suspicious about the role 
of government ownership, cannot provide a clear message about the direction of 
change of prices after privatisation, because much will depend again upon a public 
office, the regulator. If the regulator is non-benevolent, collusion between the 
privatised incumbent and the regulated utility can reverse the expected benefits of the 
divestiture of public ownership. 
Turning now to regulatory issues, important insights are given  (selectively citing 
from a very wide literature) by Newbery (2000), Laffont (2005), Rey and Vergè 
(2008), Rey and Tirole (2007). According to Newbery (2000) the restructuring of 
network industries should take advantage from differences in economies of scale of 
different segments, with the physical network usually showing sub-additive costs, 
while several upstream and downstream activities operate under a regime of constant 
or decreasing returns to scale. This leads to a paradigm of reform where vertical 
disintegration of the network is a crucial step, and access regulation is the 
institutional mechanism that would allow for competition in other activities. One 
way to evaluate this reform paradigm is to see unbundling as a structural remedy to 
market foreclosure (Rey and Tirole, 2007). Rey and Vergé (2008) show that the 
welfare effects of vertical restraints are crucially different according to a number of 
features. They conclude that while the impact on aggregate profits of a ‘vertical 
structure’ (and vertical integration can be seen as an extreme case of such 
arrangement) is positive, the impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous.  Provisions 
that wipe away double marginalisation, occurring where each of the different players 
has some market power, may be welfare enhancing. Thus, their policy conclusion is 
that “the optimal policy towards vertical restraints cannot be one such that some 
particular provisions are deemed illegal per se while some others are always 
acceptable”. In fact, the balance of the welfare impact of  ownership unbundling 
depends upon the  extent of the double marginalisation effect versus the entry effect.  11 
 
When we combine this relativistic policy conclusion, with the also relativistic 
conclusion of the discussion on privatisation in a realistic setting with incomplete 
contracts and various degrees of government benevolence, it seems difficult to 
predict price direction changes based on a robust general reform paradigm of 
network industries. Ceriani and Florio (2010) analyse theoretically the effect of 
different stages of reforms on consumers’ welfare, and show that the evaluation of 
the reform outcomes of network industries is essentially an empirical matter: it 
depends upon a set of parameters that easily lead to non-linear outcomes along the 
reform ‘line’. 
Turning then to earlier empirical literature, as for electricity, Hattori and Tsutsui 
(2004) look at 19 OECD countries (1987-1999) and consider both industrial prices 
and the ratio between industrial/household prices. They find some support for 
privatisation and liberalisation as determining price decrease. Steiner (2000), 
however, in a study of 19 OECD countries (1986-1996), finds that privatisation (and 
time to it) increases prices, while unbundling and liberalisation have the opposite 
effect. Zhang et al. (2002) study electricity residential prices in 51 developing 
countries (1985-2000) and find no effects of the reforms. Martin and Vansteenkiste 
(2001) do not find an impact of liberalisation on prices, and find that public 
ownership increases prices in the EU15, in the very short period they consider (1995-
2000). More recently, Gassner et al. (2009), in a detailed empirical study for the 
World Bank on 1,200 utilities in 71 developing and transition countries over ten 
years, including publicly owned and private sector participated ones, and with a 
different regulatory index, use differences-in-differences econometric techniques. 
They find that privatisation does not have an impact on prices and investment. 
Finally, there is very little, as far as we know, about rigorous testing regulatory 
reform in the gas industry. Copenhagen Economics (2005) is supportive of the 
reforms while Growitsch and Stronzik (2008) do not find a significant impact of 
ownership change, while some negative effect of market liberalisation. Brau et al. 
(2010) find that there is limited evidence of beneficial effects for European 
consumers from the standard package of gas industry reforms. 12 
 
5. 4B4BOUR APPROACH TO THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our empirical strategy is simple and straightforward. We want to answer the 
following research question: are privatisation and liberalisation associated with lower 
consumer prices? In other words, can we say that consumer perceptions are somehow 
not grounded on real evidence and their perception of energy price fairness is biased? 
We want to test whether consumers actually pay less when we observe a reform, 
looking at average consumer prices, controlling for relevant explanatory variables. 
This research question tests hard ‘objective’ evidence on prices, but it contains a 
potential aggregation error, as only prices for average consumers are available in 
cross-country data sets. A realistic example is when there is a change in the degree or 
the orientation of price discrimination. The analysis of softer ‘subjective’ evidence of 
individual users’ satisfaction with prices is perhaps a proxy of consumer surplus, but 
it may contain a different type of error, if individuals are biased in their perceptions. 
Looking, however, at both individual perceptions and real average prices seems 
interesting. If the empirical findings are mutually consistent, despite the different 
nature of the potential errors, the evidence on the impact of the reforms would be 
reinforced. Moreover, the second research question is also interesting in a political 
economy perspective. 
In our empirical analysis of average prices, a reduced form model for prices is 
specified and estimated, including, as explanatory variables, year fixed effects to 
capture the common trend across the EU, aggregate or detailed measures of the level 
of privatisation and liberalisation of the sector, controlling also for year fixed effects 
and other macroeconomic variables. 
The structural and evolutionary differences across the two energy industries justify 
why, while retaining a common empirical approach, our models have industry-
specific ingredients in terms of explanatory variables and controls. 
Following Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) and Bond et al. (2003) we first study 
the autoregressive (AR) properties of the average consumer price for each industry. 
As we find evidence of prices following AR(1) processes (cf. Table A1 in the 
appendix), the econometric analysis of consumer prices is performed by using 
dynamic panel data models, i.e. including among regressors also the lagged 
dependent variable for explaining the strong persistence of prices measures. 13 
 
For each energy sector, let  it P  be a measure of current net-of-tax (log) prices for 
country i at time t,  it R  the set of regulatory variables, which might include a score of 
the level of regulatory regime in each industry or measures of entry regulation, 
public ownership, market structure, vertical integration,
7
Fand  it X  a set of control 
variables.
8 The model for price levels is: 
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The year-specific intercept ( t δ ) is included to account for common cyclical or trend 
components in prices, preventing a likely form of cross-country correlation. A key 
assumption of this kind of models is that of independence of the idiosyncratic 
disturbances ( it v ) across countries. We treat the individual effects ( i η ) as stochastic, 
which implies that they are correlated with the lagged dependent variable ( ,1 it P − ), 
unless the distribution of the  i η  is degenerate. We also allow the control variables 
( it X ) and the regulatory variables ( it R ) to be correlated with the individual effect  i η .  
Maintaining that the  it v  component of the error term is serially uncorrelated, we then 
assume that  it X  is strictly exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated with all past, present and 
future realisation of  it v ). As for the set of reform variables  it R , we assume that they 
might be correlated with the unobserved error term but that, due to the political and 
decisional process involved, they react with some lag to changes in  it v . In other 
words, we assume that  it R  is predeterminate (i.e.  it R  and  it v  are uncorrelated, but  it R  
may be correlated with  ,1 it v −  and earlier shocks). 
The assumption of stochastic individual effects implies that they are correlated by 
definition with  it P , and possibly also with  it X  and  it R . Hence, we estimate our 
model using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) which, by using extra moment 
                                                 
7 We also considered introducing as regulatory variable the years spanned since the establishment of 
the sectoral independent authority (cf. Table 5) but in no regression this variable was statistically 
significant, hence it was omitted from estimations. 
8 Although we tested for several demand and sector specific variables, including input costs and 
efficiency indicators, we retained only those which proved statistically significant in at least one of the 
specification considered. 14 
 
conditions, produce consistent and efficient estimates, coping with endogeneity of 
the lagged dependent variable. 
In fact, as no external instrument is usually available outside the immediate data 
set, an alternative to OLS and Within estimates is to either transform the data to 
eliminate the individual effects or find some instruments which are orthogonal with 
the error term but not with endogenous regressors. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggested
9 transforming the data in first-difference eliminating the fixed effect, 
although the lagged dependent variable remains potentially endogenous, as the  ,1 it y −  
term in  ,1 ,1 ,2 it it it y yy −− − Δ= −  is correlated with  ,1 it v −  which is in  ,1 it it i t vvv − Δ =−  and 
predetermined variables such as  it R Δ  become potentially endogenous because they 
may also be related to  ,1 it v − . However, longer lags of the endogenous regressors 
( ,, , it s it r PR −− ΔΔ with  2,3,..., 2; 1,2,..., 2 st rt =+ =+ ) are orthogonal to the error and 
can provide additional moment conditions working in the GMM framework.FF
10
FF 
As GMM methods, as well as other methods based on instrumental variables, 
crucially rely on the existence of strong moment conditions, which will be tested. In 
all our GMM estimates, we use a one-step GMM estimator, similarly to most applied 
work in this area as simulation studies have suggested very modest efficiency gains 
from using the two-step version, even in presence of considerable heteroskedasticity 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell et al., 2000). 
We mainly use the Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test for testing 
whether autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term  it v  would render some 
lags invalid as instruments, which is a key identifying restriction in dynamic panel 
data models estimated using GMM. The test of r-order serial correlation is 
asymptotically normally distributed under the null of zero serial correlation.
11 
Finally, we also tested our estimates for robustness excluding one country from the 
sample at a time, assessing whether the results are strongly dependent on the 
inclusion of one particular country. 
                                                 
9 See also Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). 
10 Of course, also the orthogonality of the exogenous variables with the transformed error term is 
exploited and corresponding moment conditions included in all GMM estimations. 
11 Arellano and Bond (1991) find that their test has greater power than the Sargan/Hansen test to 
detect lagged instruments being invalid due to autocorrelation. 15 
 
6. 5B5BTHE DATA 
While presenting large variability in the timing and the extent of implementation of 
regulatory reforms, EU15 countries also share similar institutional characteristics and 
a common legislative direction. The primary source for the average (log) price 
variables are the International Energy Agency (IEA).FF The only alternative data 
source available for a EU15-wide analysis would be the Eurostat, which however is 
available for a much shorter time series as it starts at best in 1991. Instead, the time-
series of IEA data start in 1978, providing over 30 time series (some summary 
statistics are provided in the appendix, Table A 3). The IEA net-of-tax electricity and 
gas prices for households are expressed in €/unit and present a correlation with 
household net-of-tax electricity prices (yearly consumption of 3 500 kWh of which 
night 1 300) and gas prices (yearly consumption: 83.70 GJ) from Eurostat data equal 
to 0.814 and 0.847, respectively.
 12
FF 
As for the regulatory reform variables, including measures of entry regulation, 
public ownership, market structure, vertical integration, in varying levels of detail, 
we used data provided by the ETCR data set and already introduced in Subsection 
3.1. 
7. RESULTS 
Table 7 and Table 8 present the result of the estimation of various specifications of 
model (1) for the electricity and gas prices, respectively. These tables share the same 
structure, although they are estimated separately. The first column provides a test of 
the reform as a whole estimating model (1) where the reform variable R  is the 
ETCR sector score ranging from 0 to 6. In the following columns, we use as reform 
variables the set of dichotomous dummy variables, as described in Section 6. All 
models are estimated using GMM.  
Due to the small dimension of the whole panel, and following Blundell and Bond 
(2000) who discuss the possibility that the error term might have a small degree of 
autocorrelation due to measurement errors, we estimate these models using as 
                                                 
12 IEA monetary variables, which are expressed in US$, were converted into euro using the Eurostat 
euro/US$ exchange rate. 16 
 
instruments the three most recent lags of the dependent variable starting from period 
t-3. All estimated models pass the key identification test allowing for zero second-
order autocorrelation of residuals, as well as the Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions. All models are estimated using robust estimation as tests of 
homoskedasticity of residuals always rejects the null. 
The highly significant lagged dependent variable sheds doubt over similar panel 
data models in earlier literature without a dynamic specification, whose estimates are 
very likely to be affected by omitted variable bias, as discussed in the Appendix 
(Table A 2). 
As for the electricity industry (Table 7), it is interesting to notice that the lagged 
dependent variable is highly significant also after inclusion of year fixed-effects, 
regulatory variables and other controls. If the ETCR score, ranging from 0 (full 
privatisation, unbundling and liberalisation) to 6 (no privatisation, vertical integration 
and no free entry in the industry), is included in the regression testing whether the 
reform package as a whole had any effect on average prices, one could conclude that 
no statistically significant effect is found. If, instead of the ETCR score, a dummy 
variable for each of the three dimensions of the electricity industry reform is 
included, it emerges that only public ownership variable (ERpo_d) presents a 
consistently significant coefficient, reducing average price by roughly 0.3 (log) 
points. Vertical integration, which is strongly correlated with public ownership, is 
never statistically significant. Entry regulation is significant at the 10% significance 
level although it is mainly the freedom of choice of providers that drive this effect. 
Interestingly, the coefficient is negative suggesting that allowing consumers to 
choose provider is negatively correlated with actual price paid. This could be 
interpreted as a consequence of more advertising expenditure by the producing firms 
that is reflected on average prices or on the mistakes of actual ‘switcher’ as recently 
found in the UK (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010). Other control variables are not 
significantly correlated with average log prices, with the exception of per capita 
GDP, suggesting that electricity is a normal good. 
Hence, decomposing the ETCR score into 0-1 variables, we find that evidence on 
average price is consistent with evidence on consumers’ perception discussed in 
Subsection 3.1, in particular as far as public ownership is concerned. 17 
 
Remarkably, similar conclusions are also reached with respect to public ownership 
in the natural gas industry. Ceteris paribus, public ownership reduces price by 
roughly 0.2 log points. None of the other regulatory variables considered are found 
statistically significant as well as the other demand and supply variables tested. The 
only exception is the price of Brent oil which is consistently an important 
determinant of price dynamics. Of course, this comes with no surprise as gas prices 
have been indexed using oil market prices since the beginning of the 1990s (Table 8). 
[Table 7 and Table 8 about here] 
7.1. DIAGNOSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Since Bound et al. (1995) it is well known that weak instruments can provide 
inconsistent estimates. Hence, similarly to Blundell and Bond (2000), we estimate a 
reduced form regression of the first difference  1 log( ) t price − Δ  on 
23 2 0 log( ),log( ),...,log( ) tt t price price price −− − . A small coefficient of determination 
(
2 R ) in any of these regressions and a Wald test of slope coefficients jointly equal 
zero would signal a weak instrument set. For the electricity sector we find 
2 0.288 R =  and for the gas sector 
2 0.440 R = , which let us conclude that the lagged 
log prices in levels are acceptable instruments for the endogenous lagged first 
difference. Moreover, the null hypothesis of all instruments being jointly zero is 
rejected at any reasonable confidence level.  
In Section Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. we used GMM 
as the assumption of stochastic individual effects implies that they are correlated by 
definition with the dependent variable,  it P , and possibly also with other covariates. If 
so, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator of { ,, α βγ} in the level equations of 
model (1) is inconsistent, and this correlation remains even for  , TN →∞. A Within 
estimator would eliminate the main source of OLS inconsistency, i.e. the country 
fixed effect,  i η , however it does not completely solve the problem. In fact, for a 
small  T , the Within transformation induces a correlation between the transformed 
lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term, producing a biased 
estimator (Nickel, 1981).  18 
 
Notwithstanding their biased nature, and mainly as a robustness check, we 
estimated the dynamic panel model (1) also using OLS and Within. Table 9 and 
Table 10 show OLS and Within estimates for the electricity and gas price models, 
respectively. Compared to the GMM results and using OLS, public ownership is now 
not statistically significant as most of the variability is now captured by the lagged 
dependent variable, which is estimated with a pointwise value very close to one. 
However, when Within methods are used instead, not only the lagged dependent 
variable coefficient reduces in magnitude but also the coefficient of public ownership 
is found to be negative with p-values well below 10%, confirming what has been 
found using GMM. This result is particularly reassuring as the Within 
transformation, relying on a relatively long time series ( 20 i T ≥ , for all i), sweeps out 
most of the causes of endogeneity, hence of the source of inconsistency. 
[Table 9 and Table 10 about here] 
Finally, as a further robustness check, we tested our estimates excluding one 
country from the sample at a time, for assessing whether the results are strongly 
dependent on the inclusion of one particular country. Results for the electricity sector 
are presented in Table 11 and show that, although the magnitude of some significant 
coefficient slightly changed the positive correlation of per capita GDP is robust as 
well as the negative correlation of the dummy for public ownership with prices. The 
negative correlation between the no-free-entry dummy (ERen_d) and prices remains 
statistically significant in only 6 out of 15 samples. Robustness analysis for the gas 
sector are presented in Table 12 and mainly confirm results obtained with the whole 
sample and in particular for the role of Brent oil and public ownership in the industry 
on price levels. It should be noted however that the p-value of the Brent coefficient is 
0.132 when Spain is dropped and the p-value of the public ownership dummy is 
0.169 if the UK is dropped, although the sign is in both cases consistent with overall 
results. 
[Table 11 and Table 12 about here] 
8. 7B7BCONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Starting from an analysis of consumers perceptions, our paper offers a check of the 
impact of privatisation and of liberalisation of network industries on consumer prices 19 
 
in the EU. Moreover, while the reform is often proposed as a policy package that 
includes privatisation, vertical disintegration, and liberalisation, we disentangle the 
ownership effect after controlling for other reforms. We explicitly consider 
dynamics, use time series longer than in earlier literature, and data sources from 
international organisations, such as Eurostat, IEA, OECD, the World Bank, 
Eurobarometer. These sources are widely available to researchers for further 
empirical analysis.  
We summarise our findings as follows. 
a)  What is the overall effect of the reform package on prices and consumer 
satisfaction?  We find that the overall impact of the reform package on 
consumer prices, as summarised in the ETCR industry score, is never 
statistically significant for electricity prices and is negatively correlated 
with gas prices. This is what one would expect if the adverse allocative 
effect of privatisation is just counterbalanced by the beneficial effect of 
liberalisation (see Vickers and Yarrow (1993) and our discussion in Section 
4). An alternative interpretation is that the linear weights that the OECD 
uses for the indicator misrepresent the reforms. The results by Azmat et al. 
(2007), and by the earlier papers cited in the Introduction, however, strongly 
suggest that the OECD scores work well for several other performance 
variables, including productivity and investment. Our results, compared 
with Azmat et al. (2007), who find declining labour shares, imply an 
increase of the profitability of reformed industries. This fact may well 
sustain investment, as in Alesina et al. (2005). The combined evidence of 
lack of the overall reform impact on consumer prices, and of changes of the 
factor shares, implies a redistribution effect, that may explain the overall 
mixed or adverse perceptions of consumers. 
b)  Does privatisation per se decrease consumer prices? Our answer to the 
question is negative. Our discussion in Section 4 shows that if a public 
enterprise is very inefficient, a privatised monopoly or oligopoly, even 
without price regulation, can offer lower prices than the vertically integrated 
public monopoly, because on balance its allocative inefficiency may be less 
than its cost savings. We find, however, that this is certainly not true in the 20 
 
European Union. Consistently with this result, we find strong evidence of 
higher consumers’ satisfaction with the price paid under public ownership 
of the energy incumbent. 
Our bottom line is that while we have been able to identify a clear ownership effect, 
the overall evidence on the impact of liberalisation reforms on prices and consumers’ 
satisfaction is mixed. We are not entirely surprised by this finding, because one 
traditional objective of public ownership was to offer low prices to consumers 
(sometimes by cross-subsidies) even if these sectors were profitable. 
The finding is, however, entirely new and suggests two policy implications. First, 
while earlier reformers hoped that price caps were to be removed with full 
liberalisation, we suggest that under privatisation, continued monitoring and 
regulation of prices should be a permanent feature, because productivity gains are not 
necessarily passed to consumers
13 with ECHP panel data. Second, we suggest that 
privatisation is not a panacea, and that the European Union must remain neutral 
about public ownership. 
The belief that public ownership is necessarily associated with inefficiency, 
corruption, capture from vested interests (see e.g. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003) must be assessed against the reality that private ownership under oligopoly in 
essential services may also be socially inefficient. Private interests have an incentive 
to buy regulators and law-makers in order to be allowed to enjoy market dominance 
or, under oligopoly, they may tend to collude. The balance of the public-private 
inefficiencies varies country by country, and industry by industry, or even looking at 
specific segments of the industry. Public ownership is not necessarily the enemy of 
liberalisation. Examples are the national electricity transmission system operators 
(TSO) in the Nordic power system, perhaps one of the most advanced in the world in 
terms of regional integration and market opening.  Interestingly, the ownership 
structure of the TSOs across the four participating countries ranges from Svenka 
Krafnat (Sweden), a state agency, to the Danish and Norwegian TSOs (Energinet.dk 
and Statnett), that are corporations with the state as sole owner, to the Finnish TSO 
jointly owner by a private generator, institutional investors, and the Finnish state. In 
this context, public ownership of the networks has probably been an advantage for 21 
 
the promotion of cross-border market integration. We conclude that when there is a 
tradition of reasonably effective management in the public sector, for example in the 
Scandinavian countries, or in France, public ownership of part of the network 
industry, particularly the network itself, can still play a role in protecting consumers 
from oligopolistic exploitation. This role must be, however, assessed case by case, 
looking at the specific institutional environment. Thus, in our view article 295 of the 
EC Treaty
14 is a wise provision, in that it delegates to member states to decide 
whether in their national conditions public versus private provision is still an option 
to achieve certain objectives in the public interest.  
We suggest that if privatisation is considered on efficiency grounds, its implications 
for consumer prices and overall satisfaction must be addressed (including 
compensation mechanisms for the poor, who may suffer from tariff re-balancing and 
other adjustments of tariff structures following the divestiture of public provision).  
We suggest that in some countries and for some industries having public provision 
or a publicly owned network or a range of different arrangements (part-privatisation, 
mixed oligopoly, mutual ownership, etc.) should be allowed without any interference 
by the EU, as for article 295 of the Treaty , provided that (a) borders are open for 
capital investment and for trade, with the only limitation of national security; and 
that (b) any user is given the concrete right and opportunity to pick up the best 
possible deal in the European economic space.  
The network industries are still far from the competitive paradigm. One of the 
leading British experts in the energy sector, after having reviewed two decades of 
reform in the UK, perhaps the inspiring model for the current EC approach, 
concluded : ‘ in 1980s ad 1990s the pendulum swung too far the other way (from 
public monopoly). The market enthusiasts failed to the recognize how far the 
electricity market deviated from the normal commodity model. To recap, supply must 
instantaneously match demand as there is limited scope for storage: the assets are 
sunk or long lived, the networks are natural monopolies. There are very great 
environmental externalities; and critically, electricity and gas  are complementary to 
                                                                                                                                          
13 Particularly to most vulnerable ones, as found by Florio and Poggi (2010). 
14 In fact, Article 295 of the EC Treaty states: “ This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in 
Member States governing the system of property ownership”.  This article was included in the 1957 
Treaty to allow nationalisation of certain industries, and has not been changed over half century.  22 
 
the rest of the economy, in that failure to supply has (extremely) large costs to all 
economic activity. It is hard to think of any other activity in modern developed 
economies with quite such coincidence of major market failures. If the issue of fuel 
poverty and the distributional implications of electricity and gas pricing and supply 
are also included, it is extraordinary that anyone could have regarded these as 
anything other than political industries”. (Helm, 2003, p.407). 
Our findings offer some support to this view and tend to reject a more simplistic 
reform paradigm based on the same features, particularly privatisation everywhere. 
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Note: Price (source: IEA) deflated using the national CPI (source: WDI), at 1978 base price. Price scale on the on the left axis, ECTR indices scale on the right axis.
ER and Public ownership are ETCR 0-6 scores for the whole industry and its public ownership dimension, respecively
 
 
Table 1: Price trends and report scores for the EU15, France and the UK. 
    1978 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
   ELECTRICITY 
Price  0.14 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08  France 
ETCR score  6.00  6.00  6.00 4.28 3.61 2.61 2.61 2.11 
Price  0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12  UK 
ETCR score  6.00  0.83  0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Price  0.22 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10  EU15-average 
ETCR score  5.54  5.11  4.64  3.16 2.13 1.94 1.73 1.67 
Price  0.24 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  EU15-st. dev. 
ETCR score  0.61  1.36  1.57 1.54 1.05 0.96 0.82 0.81 
            
   GAS 
price 12.63  8.89  8.11  7.65 8.87 8.26 8.78 10.22  France 
ETCR score  6.00  6.00  6.00 6.00 3.67 3.49 2.24 2.24 
price  8.75 8.33 6.35 7.21 6.64 7.06 7.81 10.02  UK 
ETCR score  5.75  3.50  3.03 1.90 1.65 1.10 0.73 0.73 
price 11.26  8.91  7.54  7.27 8.04 8.02 9.11 10.14  EU15- average 
ETCR score  4.92  4.77  4.59  4.13 3.17 3.02 2.64 2.61 
price  6.62 3.47 2.29 1.96 2.64 2.68 2.64 2.85  EU15-st. dev. 
ETCR score  0.83  0.87  0.87 1.23 1.12 1.24 1.17 1.12 
Source: Authors' calculations using IEA, WDI and ETCR data. 
Note: Prices converted into current euro using Eurostat €/USD exchange rate. 27 
 
 
Table 2: The ETCR indicator for the electricity industry with our coding. 
 
ELECTRICITY  Original ETCR coding  Our coding 
  
Country scores 0-6  Sector 
indic.  Binary variable 0-1 
  
Question weights Weights by 
theme  Our label Coding  Our label 
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP:          
What is the ownership structure of the largest 
companies in the generation, transmission, 
distribution, and supply segments of the 
electricity industry? (ERpo1) 
1/3  1/3  1 if ownership is 
public  ERpo_d 
ENTRY REGULATION:    
How are the terms and conditions of third party 
access (TPA) to the electricity transmission grid 
determined? (ERen1)* 
1/3 
Is there a liberalised wholesale market for 
electricity (a wholesale pool)? (ERen2)* 
1/3 
What is the minimum consumption threshold 
that consumers must exceed in order to be able 
to choose their electricity supplier ? (ERen3)* 
1/3 
1/3 
1 if wholesale 
market for elect. 
is not liberalised 
& consumption 
threshold is larger 
than 1MWatts 
ERen_d 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION:        
What is the degree of vertical separation 
between the transmission and generation 
segments of the electricity industry? (ERvi1) 
1/2 
What is the overall degree of vertical integration 




1 if overall degree 
of vertical 
integration in the 
industry is mixed 
or integrated. 
ERvi_d 
Source: ETCR coding taken from Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
Notes:  
* ERen1_d is coded 1 if there is no third party access, and 0 otherwise. ERen2_d is coded 1 if there is no liberalised whole sale 
market for eletricity, and 0 otherwise. ERen3_d is coded 1 if there exist a minimum threshold that consumers must exceed in 
order to be able to choose their electricity supplier and 0 otherwise. 28 
 
 
Table 3: The ETCR indicator for the natural gas industry with our coding. 
 
GAS  Original ETCR coding  Our coding 
  
Country scores 0-6  Sector 
indic.  Binary variable 0-1 
  





otherwise)  Our label 
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP:          
What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the gas 
production/import sector are owned by government? 
What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the gas 
transmission sector are owned by government? 
1/3  1/4 
What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the gas 
distribution sector are owned by government? 
1/3   
1 if 100% of 
ownership of 
shares in all 




ENTRY REGULATION:        
How are the terms and conditions of third party access 
(TPA) to the gas transmission grid determined? 
1/3 
What percentage of the retail market is open to 
consumer choice? 
1/3 
Do national, state or provincial laws or other 
regulations restrict the number of competitors allowed 
to operate a business in at least some markets in the 
sector: gas production/import 
1/3 
1/4 
1 if no third 
party access, no 
consumers' 
choice in the 
retail market, 
and restrictions 
operate in all 
markets. 
GRen_d 
MARKET STRUCTURE:        
What is the market share of the largest company in the 
gas production/import industry? 
1/3 
What is the market share of the largest company in the 
gas transmission industry? 
1/3 
What is the market share of the largest company in the 
gas supply industry? 
1/3 
1/4 
1 if market 
share in all 




VERTICAL INTEGRATION:        
What is the degree of vertical separation between gas 
production/import and the other segments of the 
industry? 
1/3 
What is the degree of vertical separation between gas 
supply and the other segments of the industry?  1/3 




1 if the industry 
is integrated in 
all segments 
GRvi_d 
Source: ETCR coding taken from Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 29 
 
 
Table 4: Consumers' dissatisfaction with electricity prices. 
Dependent variable: individual dissatisfaction with 
prices paid for electricity supply                   
Overall  reform          
ER  -0.009       
   (0.701)                
Public  ownership        
ERpo_d    -0.105*** -0.088**  -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.115*** 
        (0.003) (0.037) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) 
Vertical  integration        
ERvi_d    0.039**  0.039* 0.037*    
    (0.038) (0.051) (0.059)    
Entry  regulation        
ERen_d   0.024      
   (0.538)      
ERen1_d    -0.066   -0.054   
    (0.237)   (0.345)   
ERen2_d    0.000   0.015   
    (0.990)   (0.563)   
ERen3_d    0.030  0.031  0.050*  0.047** 
         (0.196)  (0.101)  (0.053)  (0.042) 
Electricity  price  for  an  average  consumer  yes Yes  yes yes yes yes 
Per  capita  GDP  yes Yes  yes yes yes yes 
Year  fixed-effects  yes Yes  yes yes yes yes 
Individual  characteristics  yes Yes  yes yes yes yes 
Country  fixed-effects  yes Yes  yes yes yes yes 
Marginal effects are reported. Robust p-values in parentheses. Std. Err. adjusted for 15 country clusters.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
L e g e n d :           
ER is the ETCR 0-6 score; ERpo_d is 1 if ownership is public, 0 o.w.; ERvi_d is 1 if overall degree of vertical integration in the 
industry is mixed or integrated, 0 o.w.; ERen_d is 1 if wholesale market for elect. is not liberalised & consumption threshold is 
larger than 1MWatts, 0 o.w.; ERen1_d is 1 if there is no third party access to the electricity transmission grid, 0 o.w.; ERen2_d is 1 
if there is no liberalised wholesale market for electricity, 0 o.w.; ERen3 is the minimum consumption threshold that consumers must 
exceed in order to be able to choose their electricity supplier in a 0-6 scale. 30 
 
 
Table 5: Consumers' dissatisfaction with gas supply prices. 
Dependent variable: individual dissatisfaction with prices 
paid for gas supply             
Overall  reform        
GR  -0.083***     
   (0.000)          
Public  ownership      
GRpo_d    -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.132*** 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Vertical  integration      
GRvi_d    -0.050 -0.004 -0.009 
    (0.450) (0.968) (0.919) 
Entry  regulation      
GRen_d   -0.015    
   (0.810)    
GRen1_d    -0.011   
    (0.706)   
GRen3_d    -0.066  -0.058 
    (0.452)  (0.433) 
GRen2    0.018   
         (0.513)    
Gas price for an average consumer  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Per  capita  GDP  yes yes yes yes 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes 
Individual  characteristics  yes yes yes yes 
Country  fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes 
Marginal effects are reported. Robust p-values in parentheses. Std. Err. adjusted for 15 country clusters. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Legend:        
GR is the ETCR 0-6 score; GRpo_d is 1 if 1 if 100% of ownership of shares in all segments of the industry is 
public, 0 o.w.; GRvi_d is 1 if the industry is integrated in all segments, 0 o.w.; GRen_d is 1 if no third party 
access, no consumers' choice in the retail market, and restrictions operate in all markets., 0 o.w.; GRen1_d is 1 if 
there is no third party access to the gas transmission grid, 0 o.w.; GRen3_d is 1 if national, state or provincial 
laws or other regulations restrict the number of competitors allowed to operate a business in all markets in the gas 




Table 6: Definitions of main variables used in the price equation models. 
Label Variable  definition 
ELECTRICITY 
EAprinet  Electricity net-of-tax price for households, submitted to the IEA Secretariat by Administrations 
(in €/unit) (Source: IEA; (a)) 
ER, ERpo_d, ERen_d, ERvi_d  See Table 2 
EAscmbf  Electricity source: Total Combu. Fuels (GWh/Tj) (IEA) 
EAimports  Electricity import (GWh) (Source: IEA; (a)) 
EArescons  Electricity residential consumtion (GWh) (Source: IEA; (a)) 
MWgdppc  Nominal GDP (billion of euro) (Source: WDI; (a)) 
   
GAS 
GAprinet  Natural gas net-of-tax price for households, submitted to the IEA Secretariat by 
Administrations (in €/ unit) (SourceIEA; (a)) 
GR, GRpo_d, GRen_d, GRvi_d  See Table 3 
GAbrent  Price of Brent oil (Source: IEA; (a)) 
Notes: Variables starting with an "l", means that they were transformed in logarithms. (a) Original data are in US$ and were 




Table 7: GMM estimation of dynamic panels for electricity prices. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
                 
L.lEAprinet_kw 0.854*** 0.414*** 0.407*** 0.428*** 0.414*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ER  0.003      
  (0.690)      
ERpo_d    -0.376*** -0.356*** -0.350*** -0.366*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ERen_d   -0.106*     
   (0.072)     
ERvi_d    0.099 0.079 0.037 0.066 
    (0.233) (0.393) (0.598) (0.462) 
ERen1_d    -0.043    
    (0.483)    
ERen2_d    -0.015   -0.024 
    (0.741)   (0.596) 
ERen3_d    -0.098*  -0.100**  -0.092* 
    (0.073)  (0.049)  (0.088) 
lEAscmbf  0.025**  0.016 0.021 0.023 0.021 
  (0.011) (0.517) (0.408) (0.354) (0.409) 
lEAimports  0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.720) (0.913) (0.900) (0.936) (0.917) 
lEArescons  -0.022**  0.002  -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 
  (0.012) (0.948) (0.805) (0.820) (0.870) 
lMWgdppc  0.016  0.231*** 0.215*** 0.225*** 0.227*** 
  (0.274) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant  -0.292** -0.676** -0.683** -0.612** -0.647** 
  (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
       
Observations  402 402 402 402 402 
ar1p  0.001 0.052 0.055 0.037 0.047 
ar2p  0.281 0.952 0.733 0.735 0.787 
Number  of  country  15 15 15 15 15 
sarganp  0.064 0.257 0.201 0.188 0.205 
N.  instr.  98 85 85 85 85 
Dep. var.: log average price for electricity supply 
Source: Authors' calculations using IEA, WDI source data. IEA data used for price series. 
For exact source and variable definition refer to the label (in italics in the first column) and 
Table 6.  
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year dummies 
included in all models.  
ar1p and ar2p report the p-values of tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, 
asymptically N(0,1) under the null of no autocorrelation.  
GMM results are one-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in 
parentheses) and test statistics.  
Instruments used in all GMM equations include dependent variable at lags t-3, t-4, t-5, the 
predetermined regulatory variable (at time t-1 and earlier) and exogenous variables.  33 
 
 
Table 8: GMM estimation of dynamic panels for gas prices. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
L.lGAprinet_gj 0.712*** 0.806*** 0.795*** 0.797*** 0.811*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GR  -0.094**      
  (0.027)      
GRpo_d    -0.240***  -0.233** -0.227** -0.245*** 
    (0.007) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) 
GRvi_d    -0.025 -0.016 -0.013 -0.030 
    (0.691) (0.811) (0.840) (0.614) 
GRen_d   -0.028     
   (0.726)     
GRen1_d    0.047    
    (0.509)    
GRen2_d    -0.073  -0.043   
    (0.402)  (0.564)   
GRen3_d    -0.019  -0.005  -0.020 
    (0.900)  (0.974)  (0.890) 
lGAbrent 0.025  0.076** 0.082** 0.071*  0.072* 
  (0.591) (0.028) (0.041) (0.053) (0.052) 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant  0.843**  0.220 0.231 0.268 0.229 
  (0.048) (0.240) (0.417) (0.340) (0.405) 
       
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 
Number  of  country  11 11 11 11 11 
ar1p  0.029 0.019 0.013 0.015 0.017 
ar2p  0.561 0.392 0.499 0.486 0.430 
sarganp  0.318 0.496 0.383 0.428 0.498 
N.  instr.  83 83 83 83 83 
 
Dep. var.: log average price for gas supply.  
Source: Authors' calculations using IEA, WDI source data. IEA data used for price series. 
For exact source and variable definition refer to the label (in italics in the first column) and 
Table 6 
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year dummies 
included in all models.  
ar1p and ar2p report the p-values of tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, 
asymptically N(0,1) under the null of no autocorrelation.  
GMM results are one-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in 
parentheses) and test statistics.  
Instruments used in all GMM equations include dependent variable at lags t-3, t-4, t-5, the 
predetermined regulatory variable (at time t-1 and earlier) and exogenous variables.  
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Table 9: Robustness checks for the electricity price model. Dynamic panel estimated using OLS and Withind methods. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS Within  OLS Within  OLS Within  OLS Within  OLS Within 
                                
L.lEAprinet_kw 0.956***  0.756***  0.957***  0.747*** 0.956***  0.742*** 0.958*** 0.744***  0.956*** 0.744*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
ER  0.000  -0.005             
  (0.938)  (0.261)             
ERpo_d      0.003 -0.027*  0.002 -0.031*  0.003 -0.032**  0.002 -0.032** 
      (0.716) (0.077)  (0.751) (0.055) (0.670)  (0.043) (0.761)  (0.046) 
ERvi_d     -0.008  0.018  -0.010  0.019 -0.006  0.018 -0.010  0.019 
      (0.562) (0.292)  (0.498) (0.262) (0.639)  (0.286) (0.490)  (0.273) 
ERen_d     0.002  -0.031*          
     (0.880)  (0.082)          
ERen1_d        -0.001  -0.009       
        (0.911)  (0.536)       
ERen2_d        0.010  -0.002     0.010  -0.004 
        (0.465)  (0.889)     (0.469)  (0.789) 
ERen3_d          -0.008 -0.029* -0.004 -0.029**  -0.008 -0.028* 
          (0.583) (0.057)  (0.744) (0.044)  (0.581) (0.061) 
lEAscmbf  0.010** -0.004  0.010** -0.009  0.010** -0.009  0.010** -0.008  0.010** -0.008 
  (0.040) (0.722)  (0.043) (0.451)  (0.040) (0.463) (0.043)  (0.493) (0.041)  (0.478) 
lEAimports -0.000  -0.003**  0.000 -0.002* 0.000  -0.003* 0.000  -0.002* 0.000  -0.002* 
  (0.944) (0.049)  (0.981) (0.070)  (0.990) (0.061) (0.969)  (0.072) (0.990)  (0.071) 
lEArescons  -0.010* -0.100***  -0.010* -0.101***  -0.010*  -0.101*** -0.010** -0.102*** -0.010*  -0.102*** 
  (0.055) (0.000)  (0.051) (0.000)  (0.052) (0.000) (0.049)  (0.000) (0.051)  (0.000) 
lMWgdppc  -0.004 0.151***  -0.004 0.153***  -0.004 0.150***  -0.004 0.145***  -0.004 0.147*** 
  (0.663) (0.000)  (0.671) (0.000)  (0.663) (0.000) (0.669)  (0.000) (0.665)  (0.000) 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Constant  -0.063 1.137***  -0.056 1.172***  -0.057 1.150***  -0.052 1.135***  -0.057 1.146*** 
  (0.249) (0.001)  (0.321) (0.000)  (0.312) (0.000) (0.353)  (0.000) (0.306)  (0.000) 
                
Observations  402 402  402 402  402 402  402 402  402 402 
ar1p  0.171 0.0240 0.163 0.042  0.159 0.043  0.170 0.041  0.157 0.041 
ar2p  0.815 0.583  0.800 0.665  0.779 0.679  0.781 0.683  0.779 0.683 
Dep. var.: log average price for electricity supply. Robust p-values in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Legend: see Table 7.    35
 
Table 10: Robustness checks for the gas price model. Dynamic panel estimated using OLS and Withind methods. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS Within  OLS Within  OLS Within  OLS Within  OLS Within 
                                
L.lGAprinet_gj 0.959***  0.811*** 0.948***  0.806*** 0.939***  0.822*** 0.940*** 0.820***  0.945*** 0.818*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
GR  0.002  0.008             
  (0.706)  (0.435)             
GRpo_d      -0.010 -0.057*  -0.015 -0.070**  -0.015 -0.064*  -0.015 -0.064* 
      (0.497) (0.093)  (0.334) (0.049) (0.320)  (0.070) (0.330)  (0.067) 
GRvi_d     0.001  0.008  0.006  0.020 0.005  0.018 0.001  0.013 
      (0.912) (0.630)  (0.636) (0.360) (0.695)  (0.420) (0.911)  (0.447) 
GRen_d     0.038***  0.048**          
     (0.006)  (0.027)          
GRen1_d        0.020  0.032       
        (0.423)  (0.281)       
GRen2_d        -0.038  -0.031  -0.023  -0.011    
        (0.196)  (0.399)  (0.309)  (0.733)    
GRen3_d        0.039***  0.050*  0.041*** 0.056** 0.040*** 0.054** 
          (0.004) (0.060)  (0.003) (0.030)  (0.003) (0.032) 
lGAbrent  0.144*** 0.184***  0.149*** 0.181***  0.150*** 0.189***  0.144*** 0.181***  0.151*** 0.183*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Constant  -0.311*** -0.139  -0.301*** -0.080  -0.284*** -0.142  -0.264*** -0.103  -0.304*** -0.113 
  (0.002) (0.269)  (0.001) (0.427)  (0.006) (0.205) (0.008)  (0.331) (0.001)  (0.268) 
                
Observations  309 309  309 309  309 309  309 309  309 309 
ar1p  0.439 0.078  0.537 0.125  0.423 0.151  0.492 0.188  0.542 0.186 
ar2p  0.220 0.235  0.158 0.223  0.189 0.180  0.165 0.166  0.157 0.171 
Dep. var.: average price for gas supply. Robust p-values in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Legend: see Table 8.   36
 
Table 11: Robustness checks of GMM models of average price for electricity. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) (13)  (14)  (15) 
excluded  country belgium  denmark germany greece  italy  spain  france ireland  luxembourg  netherlandsportugal great  britainfinland  sweden austria 
                    
L.lEAprinet_kw 0.420***  0.533***  0.441*** 0.438*** 0.296*** 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.443*** 0.438***  0.416***  0.211**  0.384***  0.367*** 0.453*** 0.510*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.036) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
ERpo_d -0.373*** -0.225***  -0.335***  -0.477*** -0.432*** -0.337*** -0.350*** -0.370*** -0.353*** -0.374*** -0.266*** -0.351***  -0.356*** -0.355*** -0.230***
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ERen_d  -0.106*  -0.055 -0.084 -0.065 -0.175*** -0.097*  -0.070 -0.086 -0.041  -0.099* 0.017  -0.093*  -0.148**  -0.083  -0.076 
  (0.080) (0.239) (0.157) (0.279) (0.003) (0.091) (0.203) (0.138) (0.537)  (0.098)  (0.765) (0.097)  (0.025) (0.225) (0.172) 
ERvi_d  0.106 0.041 0.083 0.121 0.104 0.037 0.062 0.062 -0.045 0.105  0.049 -0.164 0.126 0.084 -0.041 
  (0.216) (0.420) (0.302) (0.171) (0.244) (0.521) (0.446) (0.453) (0.637)  (0.188)  (0.501) (0.173)  (0.137) (0.328) (0.501) 
lEAscmbf  0.017 0.037 0.018 -0.006  0.002 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.004  0.021  0.043**  0.029  0.012 0.008 0.027 
  (0.514) (0.102) (0.470) (0.831) (0.932) (0.425) (0.439) (0.429) (0.913)  (0.404)  (0.044) (0.247)  (0.658) (0.759) (0.253) 
lEAimports  -0.000 -0.001 0.000  -0.000 -0.001 0.000  0.001  -0.000 0.001  -0.001  -0.001 0.001  -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
  (0.930) (0.808) (1.000) (0.895) (0.667) (0.969) (0.862) (0.921) (0.773)  (0.830)  (0.818) (0.859)  (0.819) (0.958) (0.835) 
lEArescons 0.002  -0.019  -0.000  0.039  -0.001 -0.011 -0.003 -0.010 -0.078  -0.003 0.023 -0.017 0.007 0.012 -0.025 
  (0.950) (0.463) (0.997) (0.273) (0.977) (0.705) (0.915) (0.750) (0.145)  (0.917)  (0.385) (0.558)  (0.817) (0.698) (0.362) 
lMWgdppc  0.230*** 0.213*** 0.221*** 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.208*** 0.232*** 0.207*** 0.283*** 0.229***  0.397***  0.196*** 0.245***  0.224*** 0.202*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes       
Constant  -0.678** -0.484** -0.657** -0.710** -0.728** -0.529** -0.529** -0.627** 0.593  -0.718*** -1.130*** -0.681***  -0.718*** -0.621** -0.351 
  (0.013) (0.028) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.035) (0.021) (0.248)  (0.009)  (0.000) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.021) (0.119) 
                    
Observations  380 375 374 375 374 375 374 374 374  374  374 374  374 383 374 
ar1p  0.056 0.042 0.049 0.073 0.078 0.036 0.041 0.033 0.072  0.052  0.219 0.110  0.057 0.042 0.038 
ar2p  0.934 0.842 0.966 0.760 0.341 0.756 0.950 0.908 0.759  0.781  0.549 0.153  0.851 0.840 0.681 
Number  of  country  14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14  14  14 14  14 14 14 
sarganp  0.358 0.393 0.211 0.437 0.526 0.218 0.0478  0.290 0.334  0.360  0.0844  0.364  0.233 0.211 0.00890 
N.  instr.  85 85 85 84 84 85 85 85 84  85  84 84  85 85 85 
Dep. var.: log average price for electricity supply. Robust p-values in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Legend: see Table 7.     37
Table 12: Robustness checks of GMM models of average price for gas supply. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (12) 
escluded country  belgium  denmark  germany  spain  france  ireland luxembourg  netherlands  great britain  finland  austria 
              
L.lGAprinet_gj  0.790*** 0.784*** 0.796*** 0.826*** 0.804*** 0.777*** 0.808*** 0.777*** 0.854***  0.719*** 0.790*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
GRpo_d  -0.231*** -0.455*** -0.235*** -0.256*** -0.249*** -0.282*** -0.243*** -0.203**  -0.141  -0.192*** -0.252*** 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) (0.016) (0.169)  (0.010) (0.005) 
GRvi_d  -0.020 -0.058 -0.017 -0.025 -0.033 0.006  -0.044 -0.022 0.012  -0.075 -0.015 
  (0.746) (0.258) (0.796) (0.720) (0.600) (0.926) (0.468) (0.712) (0.837)  (0.286) (0.811) 
GRen_d  -0.028 -0.027 -0.036 -0.045 -0.016 -0.077 -0.018 -0.040 -0.018  -0.052 -0.031 
  (0.728) (0.724) (0.660) (0.657) (0.833) (0.378) (0.829) (0.625) (0.832)  (0.486) (0.689) 
lGAbrent  0.080** 0.070** 0.081** 0.061  0.106*** 0.063*  0.071**  0.084**  0.089**  0.085*** 0.067* 
  (0.028) (0.026) (0.031) (0.132) (0.004) (0.071) (0.039) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.008) (0.068) 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Constant  0.242 0.327*  0.229 0.227 0.124 0.285 0.252 0.253 0.050  0.409*  0.280 
  (0.218) (0.063) (0.242) (0.322) (0.457) (0.106) (0.178) (0.199) (0.798)  (0.054) (0.154) 
              
Observations  273 274 273 266 266 266 267 266 266  266 267 
Number  of  country  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10  10 10 
ar1p  0.020 0.014 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.030 0.023 0.029  0.031 0.025 
ar2p  0.367 0.771 0.372 0.270 0.394 0.190 0.286 0.485 0.705  0.305 0.422 
sarganp  0.568 0.528 0.654 0.646 0.568 0.131 0.883 0.597 0.480  0.243 0.432 
N.  instr.  83 82 83 83 82 83 83 83 82  83 83 
Dep. var.: log average price for electricity supply.  Robust p-values in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Legend: see Table 8.   38 
 
9. Appendix 
Here, we provide some evidence supporting the assumption that  0 α ≠ , using notation 
introduced in Section 5. In case (log) prices did not follow an autoregressive process, one would 
not need to use the dynamic panel toolkit for dealing with the endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable and, standard Within group transformation would be enough to sweep out the 
correlation of some regressors with the error term because of the country fixed effect. In other 
words, what would one lose if model (1) was estimated under the restriction that  0 α = ? Our 
approach to answer this question is straightforward and follows Blundell and Bond (2000). First 
of all we estimate simple AR(1) equations of (log) prices for each sector separately, including 
year dummies in all models using OLS and Within estimation methods. Table A1 presents 
results. It shows that in all models the lagged dependent variable is highly statistically 
significant, with a p-value smaller than 0.1% and with a large but statistically smaller than one 
coefficient.FF
15
FF This supports our expectations that the lagged dependent variable is a relevant 
variable to include in the analysis. 
However, as the main focus of our paper are the coefficients in vector β , we are mostly 
interested to assess whether the omission of  1 t P−  would bias its estimation. This would happen if 
,1 it P −  was correlated with the regulatory variables. Hence, we regress the one-period-lagged log 
prices first over the sector score (0-6) and a full set of time-dummies and test whether the 
coefficient of the sector score is significantly different from zero. Then we do the same replacing 
the sector score with the set of regulatory dummies (0-1), which we then use in our empirical 
investigation (Section 0) and perform an F-test of the hypothesis that all coefficients of the 
regulatory dummies are jointly zero. Results are shown in Table A 2, where the relevant test 
statistics on the regulatory variables’ coefficients is named F1. The p-values of these tests let us 
conclude that the correlation is highly significant in all specifications, except for the ETCR score 
variable in the gas sector. In other words, except for this case, we conclude that dynamic panel 
models are necessary for avoiding omitted variable bias in the β  coefficients.FF
16 
                                                 
15 We also estimated AR(2) processes but found no clear evidence on the significance of the coefficient of the two-period lagged dependent variable, so we ruled out 
the possibility of using longer lags of (log) prices among regressors. 
16 Nonetheless, we estimate dynamic panels also in the model of gas prices with ECTR score variable for consistency with other models specification. 39 
 
 
Table A1: AR(1) specification for the series of price by sector. 
  Electricity     Gas 
 (1)  (2)      (3)  (4) 
 OLS  Within      OLS  Within 
            
L.lEAprinet_kw 0.970***  0.831***    L.lGAprinet_gj 0.957***  0.812*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000) 
Country fixed-effects  no  yes         
Year fixed-effects  yes  yes    Year fixed-effects  yes  yes 
Constant -0.012  -0.290***    Constant  0.145***  0.506*** 
 (0.737)  (0.000)      (0.003)  (0.000) 
            
Observations 402  402    Observations  328  328 
R-squared 0.956  0.961    R-squared 0.953  0.958 
ar1p 0.153  0.131    ar1p  0.412  0.076 
ar2p 0.833  0.885    ar2p  0.175  0.181 
F 292.5  212.0    F  210.5  155.8 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000      Prob>F  0.000  0.000 
Source: Authors' calculations using IEA data. 
Notes: The price models estimated are simple AR(1) models where the dependent variable (log average price) is regressed over its 
value lagged one period, and year dummies. Models are estimated separately for each sector. The dependent variable is sector's log 
average price, i.e. lEAprinet_kw and lGAprinet_gj, for electricity and gas, respectively. For variable definitions and sources, refer 
toTable 2 and Table 3. 
Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Asymptotic standard erros in parentheses.  
ar1p and ar2p report the p-values of tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the 
null of zero correlation. 40 
 
Table A 2: An analysis of the omitted lagged price bias on regulatory variables. 
 Electricity      Gas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)     (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dependent variable: average utility price lagged one period      Dependent variable: average utility price lagged one period   
ER  -0.029***        GR  0.010        
  (0.006)          (0.636)        
ERpo_d    -0.135*** -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.126***    GRpo_d    0.229***  0.158*** 0.156*** 0.188*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       (0.000)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
ERvi_d   -0.081  -0.102**  -0.096*  -0.020    GRvi_d    0.044  0.091** 0.083** 0.046 
    (0.111) (0.045) (0.059) (0.684)       (0.293)  (0.030) (0.046) (0.264) 
ERen_d   0.239***       GRen_d  0.172***       
   (0.000)          (0.000)       
ERen1_d   0.058      GRen1_d    0.131     
    (0.211)          (0.115)     
ERen2_d   0.189***  0.206***     GRen2_d    -0.344***  -0.246***   
    (0.000)  (0.000)         (0.000)  (0.000)   
ERen3_d   0.028  0.030  0.108**    GRen3_d      0.212*** 0.225*** 0.203*** 
      (0.573) (0.543) (0.021)         (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Year  fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes yes   Year  fixed-effects  yes  yes  yes yes yes 
Constant  -2.181*** -2.206*** -2.171*** -2.177*** -2.228***   Constant  1.162***  1.013***  1.195*** 1.226*** 1.006*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                  
Observations 405 405 405 405 405   Observations  334 334 334  334  334 
R-squared  0.439 0.489 0.498 0.496 0.470  R-squared  0.293  0.417  0.458 0.454 0.429 
F  10.520 11.935 11.522 11.825 11.075   F  4.342  6.979  7.691 7.814 7.325 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  Prob>F  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
F1  7.723 14.97 10.37 12.55 10.05  F1  0.225  21.59  18.38 22.23 24.13 
Prob>F1  0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  Prob>F1  0.636  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Authors' calculations using IEA and ETCR source data. 
Note: The dependent variable is log average price lagged one period and is estimated separately for each sector. The price variables are lEAprinet_kw and lGAprinet_gj, 
respectively for the electricity and gas sectors. For variable definitions and sources, refer to Table A1 and Section 5.  
The null hypothesis of the F test is that all coefficients are jointly zero.  
The null hypothesis of the F1 test is that regulatory variables coefficients are jointly zero.  
41 
 
Table A 3: Some descriptive statistics for variables used in the price equations. 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
ELECTRICITY 
year  435  1992 8.38  1978 2006 
EAprinet_kw  417  0.08 1.37 0.03 0.15 
ER  435  4.37 1.80 0.00 6.00 
ERpo_d  435  0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
ERen_d  435  0.81 0.36 0.00 1.00 
ERvi_d  435  0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 
ERpo_d  435  0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
ERvi_d  435  0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 
ERen1_d  435  0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
ERen2_d  435  0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 
ERen3_d  435  0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
lEAscmbf  435  10.45  1.54 5.48 12.92 
lEAimports  435  7.80 4.13 -9.21  10.95 
lEArescons  435  9.81 1.37 5.98 11.91 
MWgdppc  435  0.02 1.90 0.00 0.09 
      
GAS 
year  321  1992 8.02  1978 2006 
lGAprinet_gj  321  1.89 0.42 0.59 2.73 
GR  321  4.39 1.11 0.73 6.00 
GRpo_d  321  0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
GRen_d  321  0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
GRms_d  321  0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
GRvi_d  321  0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
GRpo_d  321  0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
GRvi_d  321  0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
GRen1_d  321  0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
GRen2_d  321  0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
GRen3_d  321  0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
lGAbrent  321  3.02 0.42 2.32 3.95 
MWgdppc  321  0.02 1.80 0.00 0.09 
Notes: authors' calculations. For variable definitions see Table 6. 
All monetary values are in euro or converted from US$ using Eurostat euro/USD average yearly 





Table A 4: Descriptive statistics of variable used in the consumers’ price satisfaction 
analysis. 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Price paid for electricity is fair  57828  0.63  0.48  0.00  1.00 
Price paid for natural gas is fair  30811  0.66  0.47  0.00  1.00 
Price paid for fixed telephone calls is fair  51402  0.64  0.48  0.00  1.00 
Female 57828  0.53  0.50  0.00  1.00 
31 - 45 years  57828  0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00 
46 - 60 years  57828  0.25  0.43  0.00  1.00 
61 - 75 years  57828  0.19  0.39  0.00  1.00 
75 + years  57828  0.05  0.23  0.00  1.00 
End ed. age: 16 - 19 years  57828  0.38  0.48  0.00  1.00 
End ed. age: 20 + years  57828  0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00 
Single 57153  0.21  0.41  0.00  1.00 
managers 57828  0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00 
other white collars  57828 0.11  0.32  0.00  1.00 
manual workers  57828  0.21  0.41  0.00  1.00 
house person  57828  0.12  0.32  0.00  1.00 
unemployed 57828  0.06  0.23  0.00  1.00 
retired 57828  0.24  0.42  0.00  1.00 
students 57828  0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00 
pol. views: center  57828  0.35  0.48  0.00  1.00 
pol. views: right  57828  0.20  0.40  0.00  1.00 
pol. views: dk/na  57828  0.19  0.39  0.00  1.00 
resp. coop.: avg./bad  57828  0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00 
Population density (a) 57828  162.55  120.45  17.00  483.80 
GDP at market prices (billions of euro) (a)  57828  761.36  755.06  22.00  2321.50 
CPI all-items annual rate of change (a)  57828  2.27  0.96  0.10  5.30 
Electricity yearly average price (a),(b)  57828  0.14  0.04  0.06  0.24 
Gas yearly average price (a),(b) 49175  12.70  4.60  6.02  29.82 
Year 2002  57828  0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Year 2004  57828  0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00 
Year 2006  57828  0.25  0.43  0.00  1.00 
Source: Eurobarometer various surveys, except for (a), which come from Eurostat. 
Notes: Omitted variables are: Male, 15-30 years, End education age: up to 15 years, In a 
couple, Self-employed, Political views: left, Respondent's cooperation: excellent/fair. (b) for 
electricity price is households price, with Dc tariff (Annual consumption: 3 500 kWh of which 
night 1 300), including all taxes. For natural gas price is households price, with D3 tariff (year 
consumption: 83.70 GJ), including all taxes. For telecomms price is for local calls (10 
minutes).   
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